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United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation: Potential 
Competition Re-examined 
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation/ decided by the 
United States Supreme Court last term, suggested, but failed to re-
solve, important questions concerning the doctrine of potential com-
petition.2 That doctrine has been applied by the Court to determine 
whether a conglomerate merger3 violates section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.4 
The term "potential competition" encompasses two procom-
petitive effects that firms may have on concentrated markets. In 
one sense, it describes the role played by a firm that is at present out-
side a market but will probably actually enter that market in the 
relatively near future, either through expansion of its own facilities 
(a de novo entry) or through the acquisition of a firm already within 
the market.0 This type of firm, which will be called a "probable ac-
tual entrant," is expected to have two,beneficial effects when it en-
ters the concentrated market. First; if it enters de nova, there will 
be an additional source of supply, more constraint on the market 
power of existing firms, and a decrease in the possibility of collusion 
by the leading firms in the market.6 Second, in the short-run, the 
probable actual entrant will, upon entry, inject an unsettling factor 
into the market.7 · • 
The second type of potential competitor is a firm outside a rela-
tively concentrated market that, merely by its existence on the edge 
1. 410 U.S. 526 (1973), revg. 332 F. Supp. 970 (D.R.I. 1971). 
2. On the doctrine of potential competition, see United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. 
Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 
(1964); United States v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Mich. 1968), afjd., 405 
U.S. 562 (1972); United States v. Crocker-Anglo Natl. Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 
1967); J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETlTION (1956); Berger & Peterson, Conglomerate 
Mergers and Criteria for Defining Potential Entrants, 15 .ANTITRusr BuLL. 489 (1970); 
Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Economic The-
ory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285 (1967); Davidow, Conglomerate Concentra-
tion and Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-Merger Act, 68 CoLuM. L. REv. 
1231 (1968); Hale & Hale, Potential Competition Under Section 7: The Supreme Court's 
Crystal Ball, 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 171; Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: 
Some Reflections on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1007 (1969); Tur-
ner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1313 
(1965). 
3. A conglomerate merger is a merger between two firms that are neithe.r competi-
tors nor in a buyer-seller relationship. 
4. Cb. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)). Section 7 bans mergers 
and acquisitions that "substantially lessen competition,· or tend to create a monopoly" 
"in any line of commerce in any section of the country.'' 
5. See Turner, supra note 2, at 1379-86. 
6. Comment, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine, 40 
U, CHI. L. REv. 156, 159 (1972). 
7. Turner, supra note 2, at 1383. 
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of the market and irrespective of its actual intent to enter, is pre-
sumed to have a procompetitive effect on the pricing behavior of 
firms within the market because they perceive it to be a likely en-
trant. 8 It is assumed that firms within the market react to the 
presence of such a perceived potential entrant by limiting their price 
to a level below that which they could otherwise command. Since 
these firms can still take advantage of their market power and the 
barriers to entry to reap above average profits, they have an incentive 
to "limit price" in order to keep out the potential entrant. The ef-
fect of a perceived potential entrant on a market has been called 
the "edge effect."0 
A merger that eliminates a potential competitor and conse-
quently removes the beneficial impact that it has or may have on 
the market has been found to violate section 7 of the Clayton Act.10 
The beneficial impact of a potential competitor may also be lost 
through a merger where the acquiring firm is of such a size that its 
presence in the market raises the barriers to entry.11 Once entry 
barriers are raised, the most probable actual entrants outside the 
market will be less likely to enter, and the firms in the market, 
perceiving that entry is now more difficult, will be able to raise 
their prices somewhat without encouraging entry by perceived po-
tential competitors. 
In Falstaff problems were raised concerning the use of subjective 
evidence in determining whether a firm is a potential competitor;12 
the legality of the acquisition of a large existing firm by a potential 
competitor when a small, "toehold" firm could have been acquired;18 
and the extent to which incipient effects should be considered in 
deciding 1vhether a conglomerate merger violates section 7.14 These 
problems were not resolved because the case was decided on narrow 
grounds, but the fact situation in Falstaff and the suggestions made 
in that case by the various justices warrant close examination. 
Falstaff involved the not uncommon situation in which the ac-
quiring firm was allegedly both a probable actual entrant and a per-
s. See id. at 1362-79. 
9. See United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1232-34 (C.D. Cal, 
1973), appeal docketed, 42 U.SL.W. 3471 (U.S., Feb. 9, 1974) (No. 73-1224). 
IO. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1967). 
11. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967); United States v. 
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 557-58 (N.D. Ill. 1968). 
12. Brodley, supra note 2, at 332, 356-59. 
13. See, e.g., Bendix Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REc. REP. ,i 19,288 
(F.T.C. 1970), revd. on other grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971). See generally Com-
ment, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 
156 (1972). 
14. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 76 (10th Cir. 1972), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S., Oct. 25, 1972) (No. 72-637); Comment, supra 
note 13, at 157 n.9. 
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ceived potential competitor. The Court's opinion only discussed the 
loss of Falstaff as a perceived potential competitor,15 but the concur-
ring justices also considered the loss of Falstaff as a probable actual 
entrant.16 
The case involved Falstaff's 1965 acquisition of Narragansett 
Brewing Company. Falstaff was the fourth largest producer of beer 
in the United States at the time of the acquisition. Of the ten largest 
brewers in the nation, only three, including Falstaff, did not sell in 
New England.17 Four brewers who sold throughout the nation en-
joyed competitive advantages in terms of advertising, prestige, and, 
according to the Court, freedom from local weather and labor 
problems.18 Consequently, Falstaff became interested in gaining na-
tional brewer status and, to that end, sought to enter the New Eng-
land market.19 After negotiation with several brewers in the north-
east,20 Falstaff concluded an agreement to acquire Narragansett, the 
largest seller of beer in the New England market.21 
The district court denied a government request to have the ac-
quisition enjoined; the court held that there was an insufficient prob-
ability that the acquisition would result in a substantial loss of 
competition because Falstaff was not a potential competitor in the 
New England market.22 In determining whether Falstaff wa~ a po-
tential competitor, the district court considered only the question of 
probable actual entry and decided that question in favor of Falstaff 
solely on the basis of statements by Falstaff's officers that the com-
pany had decided not to enter the market at all unless it could ac-
quire a brewer with a viable distribution system: "[Falstaff] execu-
tives had carefully considered such possible alternatives as (1) acqui-
sition of a small brewery on the east coast, (2) the shipping of beer 
from its existing breweries, . . . (3) the building of a new brewery 
on the east coast and other possible alternatives, but concluded that 
none of said alternatives would have affected a reasonable probability 
of a profitable entry for it in [the] New England Market."23 
15. See 410 U.S. at 532-37. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. While Justice Douglas joined in the 
substantive portion of the Court's opinion, he also wrote a separate concurrence. Jus-
tice Marshall concurred in the result. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice-Stewart, dis-
sented on the ground that the Justice Department's arguments before the Court were 
based on a theory that had not been presented to the district court. Justices Brennan 
and Powell did not participate in the decision of the case. ' 
16. See 410 U.S. at 544-45 (Douglas, J.), 548,571 (Marshall, J.). 
17. 410 U.S. at 528. 
18. 410 U.S. at 529. 
19. 410 U.S. at 529. 
20. Brief for the United States at 31. 
21. 410 U.S. at 528. 
22, 332 F. Supp. at 972. 
23. 332 F. Supp. at 972. 
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The Supreme Court remanded the case for a reassessment of Fal-
staff as a potential competitor.24 Five justices agreed that the district 
court's assessment of the legality of the acquisition had been too 
narrow, but they could not agree on the approach that the lower 
court should have adopted. 
The majority, in an opinion by Justice White, found that the 
district court had erred in failing to consider whether Falstaff was 
a perceived potential entrant: 
The error lay in the assumption that because Falstaff, as a matter of 
fact, would never have entered the market de novo, it could in no 
sense be considered a potential competitor. More specifically, the Dis-
trict Court failed to give separate consideration to whether Falstaff 
· was a potential competitor in the sense that it was so positioned on 
the edge of the market that it exerted beneficial influence on com-
petitive conditions in that market.25 
The question, then, was not settled by determining that the Falstaff 
management had decided against entry by a toehold acquisition or 
de novo. In order to determine whether Falstaff had a beneficial 
effect as a perceived potential competitor, the court must consider 
whether "it would appear to rational beer merchants in New Eng-
land that Falstaff might well build a new brewery to supply the 
northeastern market."26 Because the case had to be remanded to 
consider this question,. the Court felt there was no need to reach 
such questions as whether a merger should be barred even if it had 
no present effect on competition.27 
Justice Marshall, in a lengthy opinion concurring in the result, 
focused on Falstaff's role as a probable actual entrant and criticized 
the trial court's handling of that question. Noting that the govern-
ment had not alleged that Falstaff had a present procompetitive 
effect as a perceived potential entrant, he did not think that the 
lower court should be faulted for neglecting to consider that possi-
bility.28 Nonetheless, as Justice Marshall saw it, the case should be 
remanded because a finding that Falstaff was not a probable actual 
entrant should not be based solely on the relatively unreliable sub-
jective evidence of management intent when there was strong ob-
jective evidence to the contrary.29 Justice Marshall thought that the 
majority's focus on present competitive effects was too narrow:80 
24. 410 U.S. at 537. 
25. 410 U.S. at 532-33. 
26. 410 U.S. at 533. 
27. 410 U.S. at 537. 
28. 410 U.S. at 545-46. 
29. 410 U.S. at 563-70. 
30. 410 U.S. at 557. 
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Even if at the time of the merger the market structure had not yet 
produced anticompetitive behavior, the role that a de novo entry by 
Falstaff would play in deterring possible future anticompetitive prac-
tices should be evaluated. 
Justice Douglas, while joining the Court's opinion, wrote a sep-
arate concurrence in which he agreed with Justice Marshall's asser-
tion that the government need not demonstrate that Falstaff's 
acquisition had marked immediate anticompetitive effects.81 He 
would have been willing to direct the entry of judgment against 
Falstaff on the basis of the evidence that Falstaff was the most likely 
entrant and that the merger increased the trend in the market 
toward concentration.82 Justice Douglas also argued strongly that 
acquisitions like that in Falstaff should be discouraged because they 
lead to an increase in the control of local businesses by out-of-state 
companies.83 
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. He felt 
that the majority improperly interfered with the· decision of the 
trier of fact.84 He also rejected Justice Marshall's denigration of 
subjective evidence and argued that any economic decision is largely 
subjective.35 
This Note will examine and criticize the perceived potential 
competition doctrine suggested by the Court. Then, it will discuss 
the questions raised in the concurrences concerning the use of sub-
jective evidence and the role of incipient competitive effects. Finally, 
an alternative approach that focuses on the acquisition of or the 
possibility of acquiring small, "toehold" firms will be proposed. 
I 
The doctrine that a firm outside a relatively concentrated market 
plays a procompetitive role as -a perceived potential competitor is 
based on the economic theory of limit-pricing. According to this 
theory, sellers in an oligopolistic inc;Iustry will weigh the possibility 
of attracting new entrants when . making their price-output deci-
sions.36 It is assumed that a firm in an oligopolistic market will rec-
ognize that the entry of another firm will detrimentally affect its 
rate of return. Consequently, the firm may lower its price to a point 
where this threat to future_ profitability is deterred but where it 
31. 410 U.S. at 539. 
32. 410 U.S. at 545. 
33. 410 U.S. at 542-44. 
34. 410 U.S. at 576. 
35. 410 U.S. at 575-76. 
36. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 221-22 
(1970): P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EFFECTS, POLICIES ch. 10 (forthcoming). 
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continues to earn a supernormal rate of return made possible by 
the oligopolistic setting. In other words, the presence of perceived 
potential entrants may cause firms in a concentrated market to limit-
price. Through this edge effect, potential competition serves as a 
partial substitute for actual competition.37 
If limit-pricing is to occur and is to give rise to a procompetitive 
effect that will be lost in merger, it would seem that at least four 
conditions are necessary: (I) The structure of the relevant market 
must be conducive to oligopolistic pricing; (2) the perceived poten-
tial competitor must be "unique" in that it is the only or one of the 
few most favored potential entrants; (3) the firm outside the market 
must be perceived by those within the market as likely to enter and 
as likely to enter in a way that firms in the market would want to 
deter; and (4) the general condition of entry for the relevant market 
must be such that the profit-maximizing strategy would be to limit-
price. 
The need for an oligopolistic market is clear:' A perceived po-
tential entrant cannot affect prices in a market unless those already 
within the market can themselves influence the prices. If firms within 
the market can individually have a significant effect on prices, an 
oligopoly exists by definition.38 In an oligopoly setting rival firms 
recognize the interdependence of their price-output decisions.30 
Therefore, these firms may tacitly coordinate their pricing and out-
put decisions to earn above normal rates of return. Because firms 
in this situation will want to preserve their market position in order 
to continue making these higher profits, the presence of a perceived 
potential competitor may lead to limit-pricing and a lower market 
37. C. WILCOX, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 7-8 (Temp. Natl. 
Econ. Comm. Monograph No. 21, 1940). 
38. F. SCHERER, supra note 36, at 10. Economists commonly use concentration ratios 
to determine whether a given market is a probable oligopoly. The concentration ratio 
is expressed as the percentage of sales attributable to a certain number of firms in the 
market (usually four or eight firms). Different economists use different standards. See, 
e.g., J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 128 (1959) (four-firm concentration ratio of 50 
per cent constitutes high-moderate concentration); U.S. Department of Justice Merger 
Guidelines, I TRADE REG. REP. 1J 4510, at 6884 (1971) (four-firm concentration ratio 
of 75 per cent indicates a highly concentrated market); C. KAYSEN &: D. TURNER, ANTI-
TRusr POLICY: AN ECONOl\llC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 72 (1959) (a loose oligopoly contains 
less than 20 firms that supply 75 per cent of the market, with no firm supplying more 
than 10-15 per cent; a tight oligopoly is composed of eight or fewer firms supplying 50 
per cent of the market, with the largest firm supplying more than 20 per cent). 
39. As Chamberlin put it: 
If each seeks his maximum profit rationally and intelligently, he will realize tlmt 
when there are only tivo or a few sellers hi~ own move has a considerable effect 
upon his competitors, and that this makes it idle to suppose that they will accept 
without retaliation the losses he forces upon them. Since the result of a cut by 
any one is inevitably to decrease his own :r.rofits, no one will cut, and, although the 
sellers are entirely independent, the equilibrium result is the same as though there 
were a monopolistic agreement beaveen them. 
E. CHA?.mERLIN, THE THEORY OF MoNOPOLJSTIC COMPETITION 48 (6th ed. 1950). 
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price than would otherwise occur. If the market were competitively 
structured, the market price would be set by the marketplace, not 
the individual firms. Thus, a firm outside the market would have no 
effect on price. As Professor Turner has said, for a perceived poten-
tial competitor to make a difference "[t]he market concerned must 
be an oligopoly market: the number of actual sellers must be suffi-
ciently small for them to be able collectively, though not necessarily 
collusively, to maintain prices above competitive levels."40 At least 
on the basis of objective criteria, this structural condition appears 
to have been satisfied in the New England market involved in Fal-
staff, even if there was some competition among the firms in the 
market, for, in 1965, the year of the acquisition, the four-firm con-
centration ratio in that market was 61.3 per cent, which has been 
considered indicative of a tight oligopoly.41 
The second condition arises from the fact that a merger will not 
eliminate a procompetitive effect arising from limit-pricing unless 
that merger involves an outside firm that was a uniquely likely en-
trant, or, at least, one of the few most likely entrants.42 If there were 
many equally likely entrants, the firms that remain on the edge of 
the market after an entry would continue to exert a strong restrain-
ing effect on price decisions of sellers. In that situation the loss of 
one perceived potential, competitor would be insignifican,t, as it 
would not result in a change in the pricing policies of those in the 
market. Although detailed information on potential entrants for 
the New England beer market is unavailable, it seems reasonable 
to believe that Falstaff, as a regional brewer, was one of a few spe-
cially favored potential entrants. In market-extension cases43 such 
as Falstaff it is not unusual for the chief source of rivalry to be a 
firm that is already producing in a region that includes several other 
geographic markets.44 Even among the regional brewers, Falstaff held 
a unique position as a potential entrant for the New England mar-
40. Turner, supra note 2, at 1363. See also Davidow, supra note 2, at 1244. 
41. 410 U.S. at 27-28. Because the four-firm concentration ratio was above 50 per 
cent and the largest firm, Narragansett, had 20 per cent of the market, the New Eng-
land market at the time of the acquisition came within the Kaysen and Turner· defini-
tion of tight oligopoly. See n_ote 38 supra. Thus, even though there was no evidence 
that the firms were engaging in blatantly anticompetitive conduct, 410 U.S. at 550 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring), the structural condition under which perceived potential competi-
tion is assumed to have a beneficial impact was present. 
42. Turner, supra note 2, at 1363. See also Davidow, supra note 2, at 1247. 
43. A market-extension merger is a conglomerate merger involving tw·o firms selling 
the same product in different geographic markets. Davidow, supra note 2, at 1232. 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129, 148 (N.D. 
Cal.), affd., 385 U.S. 37 (1967); Foremost Dairies, Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] 
TRADE REG. REP. 1J 15,877, at 20,689 (F.T.C. 1962). In the beer industry, the "most 
promising source of new competition is that of [an] established brewer moving into 
a new geographic market." Elzinga, The Beer Industry, ,in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
INDUSTRY 189, 202 (4th ed. W. Adams 1971). 
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ket. Of the three regional brewers among the top ten not already 
selling in that market, Falstaff was the largest.45 The other two, 
Hamm and Coors, were significantly smaller than Falstaff; and, more-
over, their closest breweries were much farther from New England 
than Falstaff's.46 
It is not sufficient that the outsider's position be unique. All 
firms within the market must also perceive the outsider as likely to 
enter in a way that they would like to discourage. Justice White 
recognized the importance of the perception of the existing sellers,47 
but he failed to consider the possibility that the sellers could have 
, any one of several different perceptions as to the form-de novo 
entry, acquisition of a toehold firm, or acquisition of a leading firm 
-that the entry of the perceived potential competitor would take. 
The kind of perception could be critical to the incentive to deter 
entry. For instance, existing sellers will normally be more anxious 
to deter de novo entry than toehold acquisition, because the former 
would immediately add new capacity and would be most likely to 
reduce their post-entry output or price.48 However, because it typi-
cally does not add substantial new capacity, entry by acquisition of 
a leading firm, if perceived to be the most likely method, would not 
be as likely to lead to limit-pricing.49 It is unlikely that Falstaff was 
perceived as a potential de novo entrant because of the nature of 
cost and demand conditions in the beer industry, which encourage 
a prospective entrant to enter a market in a manner that will allow 
it to operate as near to optimal scale as possible. Because the costs 
of transporting beer are relatively high, 50 most beer production takes 
place at less than optimal scale in geographically dispersed plants.1l1 
45. 410 U.S. at 553 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
46. Brief for the United States at 5. 
47. See 410 U.S. at 533-34 &: 534 n.13. 
48. However, if existing sellers expect that a toehold entry might increase the ac-
quiring firm's chances of successful market penetration, they may be more anxious to 
deter toehold entry than de novo entry. 
49. Bain, for example, excludes from bis definition of entry the "change of owner-
ship or control of existing operating capacity." J. BAIN, supra note 2, at 5. This con-
clusion assumes that the firm presently in the market does not view itself as a likely 
subject of a leading-firm acquisition. Otherwise, it might follow a limit-pricing policy 
so as to minimize its chances of being taken over. 
50. Scherer, The Determinants of Industrial Plant Size: An International Com• 
parisons Study, in F. SCHERER, A. BECKENSTEIN, E. KAUFER &: R. MURPHY, THE ECONOIIIICS 
OF MULTI-PLANT OPERATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS STUDY ch. 3, at 44 (Nov. 
1971). According to Scherer's estimates, transport costs amount to 7.8 cents on each 
dollar's worth of beer. The trend toward package sales, see Elzinga, supra note 44, at 
211, has made transportation costs even more significant, because the beer must be de-
livered to a large number of small-package dealers. 
51. Scherer estimates that the minimum optimal scale (MOS) in brewing is 4.!i mil-
lion barrels per year. The cost penalty of operating at one-third MOS was estimated 
at 5 per cent. In other words, a brewery producing 1.5 million barrels per year would 
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Moreover, since demand for beer is only slowly increasing,52 any 
addition of substantial new capacity is likely to have a depressing 
effect on price.53 Through acquisition of a leading firm an entrant· 
could be operating closer to optimal scale in a shorter period of time 
·without also increasing supply and thereby depressing the price. 
Thus, existing sellers would rationally perceive entry by leading-firm 
acquisition to be more likely than de novo entry.54 In fact, the 
director of marketing for Narragansett testified that it had never 
occurred to those ·within the market that Falstaff would attempt a 
de novo entry.55 Nonetheless, Falstaff may have been perceived as 
a likely entrant by- toehold acquisition. By acquiring a small existing 
brewer Falstaff could achieve, to some extent, the advantages that 
could be achieved by acquisition of a leading firm. Because toehold 
entry will allow an entrant to capture a greater share of the market 
more quickly than if it had entered de novo, the cost disadvantages 
of operating below optimal scale are mitigated. Furthermore, since 
this form of entry adds less new capacity than a de novo entry does, 
the depressing effect on price is less. There was evidence that Falstaff 
had previously expanded by acquiring failing breweries and strength-
ening their competitive position.56 Consequently, Falstaff may have 
been perceived as a likely toehold entrant, and existing sellers may 
experience 5 per cent higher costs than a brewery of MOS size. Scherer, supra note 50, 
at 29. 
An examination of the operations of the ten largest breweries reveals that a sig-
nificant proportion of them are operating plants below MOS. Given their level of sales 
in 1972, see STANDARD &: PooR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS: Liquor-Basic Analysis L57 (Oct. 18, 
1973 (section 2)), Anheuser-Busch, Schlitz, and Pabst, the three largest brewers, could 
operate, respectively, six, four, and three plants at MOS. Falstaff could operate only 
one and one-half MOS plants. But, in fact, Anheuser-Busch operates eight breweries, 
Schlitz operates nine breweries, and Pabst operates five breweries, while Falstaff was 
operating seven breweries at the time of suit. MooDY's INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 214, 2468, 
2917, 534 (1972). 
52. The rate of growth in the New England market was termed "substantial" by 
Justice Marshall, 410 U.S. at 550, although, at less than 2.5 per cent a year, it was less 
than the national growth rate. The average compound annual rate of growth in the 
national market for the ten years preceding 1972 was approximately 3.8 per cent. 
STANDARD&: POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 51, at L57. 
53. In fact, such entry could be economically undesirable. The addition of new ca-
pacity would mean that other firms would be operating at a scale even further below 
the optimum so that there would be a loss in productive efficiency. See note 51 supra. 
54. In a study of several different markets Harris found that, when the growth of 
demand and the profit rate are relatively low, "it is much less reasonable to suppose 
that even a bona fide potential competitor would enter with new capacity if he could 
not merge." M. Harris, Entry, Barriers to Entry, and Limit Pricing 148 (Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Columbia University, 1973). 
55. 410 U.S. at 546 n.2 (Marshall, J., concurring). Falstaff also argued that it was 
an unlikely de novo entrant because it was "firmly committed against attempting to 
penetrate" the New England market until "it could obtain a strong, viable distributor 
organization therein." Jurisdictional Statement of United States at 21. . 
56. 410 U.S. at 552 n.7 (Marshall, J., concnrring). 
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thus have had some incentive to limit-price, although a weaker in-
centive than if Falstaff were perceived as a likely de novo entrant. 
Even if Falstaff were perceived as a likely de novo or toehold en• 
trant, the general entry conditions for the New England market may 
have made a limit-pricing response unlikely. According to theory, 
the likelihood that limit-pricing will occur is dependent upon the 
barriers to entry for the market. 57 Impediments to market entry may 
take the form of high production costs due to existing economies of 
scale,58 high advertising costs due to product differentiation,llo high 
costs of capital, 00 and any additional costs that must be borne by 
an entrant.61 There are four possible conditions of entry: easy, in-
effectively impeded, effectively impeded, or blockaded. In a market 
with easy entry conditions any price above the competitive price will 
attract entry, and in a blockaded market62 a strategy with the goal of 
deterring entry is not necessary because the profit-maximizing price 
is below the entry-forestalling price. In an ineffectively impeded mar-
ket the most profitable approach is to maximize short-run profits. 
Only if the general conditions of entry can be characterized as "effec-
tively impeded" is the most profitable strategy to forgo some short-
run profits and limit-price to deter entry and maximize long-run 
profits. In practice, there is a continuum of possible strategies; the 
extent to which existing firms will limit-price depends on any long-
run cost advantages that they have, the expected rates of market 
share erosion and technological change, and the discount rate that 
they apply to future profits. 63 
The general condition of entry of the New England beer market, 
on the basis of the little information available, would seem to have 
been close to ineffectively impeded, so a limit-pricing strategy on 
the part of existing sellers would have been unlikely. If the existing 
sellers have no long-run cost advantages over the outsider, a limit-
pricing strategy on the part of existing sellers is unlikely, for limit-
pricing may fail to keep the potential entrant out of the market or 
may require too great a loss of pro.fits for the inside firms. Narra• 
gansett probably had long-run cost disadvantages relative to Falstaff. 
Narragansett was typical of the brewers in the New England market 
57. J. BAIN, supra note 2, at 4-6. These barriers can be examined in two frameworks 
-the "immediate condition of entry" and the "general condition of entry." The former 
refers to the highest price level that existing firms can reach without inducing the entry 
of the most favored entrant. The latter refers, inclusively, to each successive price level 
over which each highly favored firm would successively enter the market. Id. at 9. 
58. Id. at 14-16. 
59- Id. 
60. Id. 
61- G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968). 
62. J. BAIN, supra note 2, at 21-22. 
63. Id. 
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in that it was operating far below minimum optimal scale (MOS). 
Its market share of about 20 per cent translates to about 1.2 million 
barrels per year, or below one-third MOS. Thus, Narragansett's pro-
duction costs were at least 5 per cent higher than at MOS.~4 In the 
long run, Falstaff could e..xpect to capture a market share sufficient 
to enable it to operate as close or closer to MOS than Narragansett. 
Additionally, since Falstaff would be operating on a nationwide 
scale, it would enjoy promotional economies that local brewers like 
Narragansett could not realize.65 Nor would the national brewers 
(Anheuser-Busch, Schlitz, Pabst, and Miller) that were already selling 
in New England be expected to enjoy any significant long-run cost 
advantages over Falstaff. Once it entered, Falstaff could also realize 
the advertising economies and other advantages of national brewer 
status.60 
In the short run, Falstaff would be disadvantaged in that it would 
have to incur additional costs in making its initial penetration of 
the New England market.67 Because the price in the market would 
partly determine the extent of Falstaff's losses during this period, 
a limit-pricing strategy might seem to be a rational method to deter 
entry. However, all entrants, including those that .are existing sellers, 
had to, at some time in the past, absorb initial entry losses. Falstaff, 
because of its strong position in other markets, was in a particularly 
good position to overcome these barriers. Moreover, price may not 
have been the critical factor in Falstaff's ability to bear short-run 
losses, since the significance of additional short-term costs depends 
on both the level and rate of the entrant's market penetration. Be-
cause it would be distributing a national brand after entry, Falstaff 
might have been expected to achieve an acceptable share of the 
market in a relatively short time, particularly if it entered by toe-
hold acquisition. Consequently, limit-pricing probably would not 
have deterred entry. 
Again, the Court's opinion failed fully to appreciate the com-
64. See note 51 supra. 
65. Because of the high intensity of advertising in the brewing industry, see Elzinga, 
supra note 44, at 209, these economies may be particularly important. See 410 U.S. at 
553 (Marshall, J., concurring). But see Horowitz & Horowitz, Firms in a Declining Mar• 
ket: The Brewing Case, 13 J. INDus. EcoN. 129, 151 (1965). 
66. Since market-extension mergers often involve entry by a large producer already 
in several other markets, potential entrants in such cases will usually not be sig-
nificantly disadvantaged relative to existing sellers. Therefore, limit-pricing may be 
unlikely in such cases: "['I']he critical price depends on the cost of the most efficient 
potential entrant and, hence, on just which firms are already in the group. It may then 
not be in the interest of existing firms to try to prevent the entry· of very efficient pro-
ducers, since this might require an unprofitably low price." Modigliani, New Develop-
ments on the Oligopoly Front, 66 J. PoL. EcoN. 215, 231 (1958). 
67. See generally R. CAVES, AMERICAN lNDUSl'RY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 
23-26 (3d ed. 1972). 
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plexity of any determination that Falstaff had an edge effect on 
behavior in the New England market. Justice White appears to 
have assumed that, if Falstaff was perceived as a potential entrant, 
firms in the market would necessarily limit-price. The much more 
detailed factual analysis suggested above is necessary before that 
conclusion can be made. 
A more basic criticism of the Court's opinion would call into 
question the very validity of the perceived potential competition 
doctrine because its foundation, limit-pricing theory, is weak. The 
difficulty in that economic rationale lies in its assumptions about the 
knowledge and motivations of economic actors. Limit-pricing the-
orists seem to assume both imperfect knowledge on the part of some 
firms and perfect knowledge on the part of others. 68 
The theory assumes that the firm on the edge of the market will 
take the present market price as an upper limit for a post-entry 
price and that this perception will affect its decision to enter. It also 
assumes that firms already in the market believe that the bystander 
views the present market price in this way and that they will choose 
to and be able to limit their prices in a way that effectively keeps 
the bystander out. 
There is a basic flaw in the assumption made about the out-
sider's perception-and, consequently, in the assumption made about 
the insider's view of the outsider's perception-for there are a variety 
of ways in which a potential entrant may view the relation between 
existing and post-entry prices. As Modigliani pointed out, the 
"price that is relevant to the potential entrant is the price after 
entry."69 A leading limit-pricing theorist has hypothesized that a 
potential entrant is "likely to read the current price policies of es-
tablished firms as some sort of 'statement of their future intentions' 
regarding their [pricing] policies."70 But a potential entrant may 
regard the limit-price as a bluff and predict that the existing firms' 
post-entry reaction will be to reduce output and make room for the 
entrant, rather than to reduce price further.71 If the existing sellers 
recognize that the outsider will make this prediction, they will 
hardly be inclined to limit their prices. The likelihood that a limit-
pricing strategy will be perceived as a bluff is especially high when 
the outside firm has considerable knowledge about cost and demand 
conditions in the product market, knowledge that would normally 
68. Berger & Peterson, supra note 2, at 492. 
69. Modigliani, supra note 66, at 216 (emphasis original). 
70. J. BAIN, supra note 2, at 95. 
71. E. SINGER, ANTITRU5r ECONOMICS 99 (1968). See also Berger & Peterson, supra 
note 2, at 492. Stigler questions limit-pricing theory because it assumes that a prospec-
tive entrant will "believe that after his entry a colluding group will not revise its 
policy so that all will earn returns above the competitive level." G. STIGLER, supra note 
61, at 21. 
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be present in market-extension cases such as Falstaff. In fact, Falstaff 
may have had an unusually accurate perception of the probable post-
entry reactions of at least the national firms because it competed 
with them in other markets. If a bystander firm perceives the low 
price to be a bluff, that price will not be a significant factor in its 
decision whether to enter the market.72 
Moreover, even if the bystander does not believe that ·the low 
price is a bluff, potential profitability in the new market may not be 
determinative in the firm's decision to enter.73 A firm may also de-
cide to expand .for sales maximization motives,74 considerations of 
prestige,76 or economies in advertising.76 Indeed, there was evidence 
that Falstaff was motivated by these considerations in deciding to 
enter the New England market.77 To the extent that firms already 
in the market realize that price may not be the most important 
determinant of whether a bystander will decide to enter the market, 
their decisions will not be influenced by the presence of a perceived 
potential entrant. 
Additionally, even if existing sellers believe that their price de-
cisions will influence the attractiveness of entry, the presence of a 
perceived potential entrant may not change current pricing behavior 
in a concentrated market. The firms in the market may choose to 
adopt some other entry-preventing strategy, such as raising barriers 
to entry by increasing advertising expenditures.78 Also, there may be 
other effective constraints on oligopolistic pricing, so that the per-
ceived potential competitor makes no difference. For example, pric-
ing above competitive levels will occur only if there is at least tacit 
coordination among the firms in the market. Although coordina-
72. There is little empirical evidence that price has a determinative effect on 
whether firms decide to enter a market. However, one recent study found a statistically 
significant positive relationship between pre-entry profit rates and actual entry. M. 
Harris, supra note 54, at 155. 
73. Economists have argued that a variety of other motives besides profit maximiza-
tion may influence firm behavior. See generally J. MARKHAM, CONGLOMERATE ENTERPRISE 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 28-30 (1973); Baldwin, The Motives of Managers, Environmental 
Restraints, and the Theory of Managerial Enterprise, 78 Q.J. EcoN. 238 (1964); Blake 
&: Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 422, 460 
(1965); Machlup, Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial, 57 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 1 (1967); Mueller, A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers, 83 Q.J. EcoN. 643 
(1969); Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. EcoN. REv. 
1032 (1963). 
74. Baumol has pointed out that businessmen may be particularly interested in sales 
growth because of its relation to their product's image, their credit-rating, their per-
sonnel relations, and their personal career advancement. W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BE-
HAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 46-47 (1959). . 
75. Blake&: Jones, supra note 73, at 460. 
76. Id. 
77. See 410 U.S. at 553,571 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
78. See note 88 infra. 
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tion may be fairly likely in an oligopoly because of the firms' mutual 
recognition of interdependence, it will often be difficult to achieve.70 
Firms in concentrated markets may have divergent outlooks and 
preferences, resulting from variations in cost functions, 80 different 
time horizons with respect to short- and long-run profit maximiza-
tion, 81 and product differentiation.82 Moreover, costs of coordination 
and enforcement may limit oligopolistic pricing.83 There are reasons 
to believe that, even if there had been no perceived potential en-
trants, brewers in the New England market would not have been 
able to raise their prices significantly above the competitive level. 
Tacit coordination may have been difficult because of the differing 
market problems of national and local brewers,84 problems with idle 
capacity due to the seasonal nature of the demand for beer, 80 and 
efforts to maintain a price differential between premium and non-
premium brands. 86 In fact, there was evidence that there was con-
siderable competition in the New England market.87 Were this in 
fact the case, the existence of a perceived potential competitor would 
make no difference, because actual competition in the market would, 
in itself, be an effective constraint on pricing. 
Even where actual competition is not a constraint, perceived po• 
tential competition may not have a beneficial effect if the firms in 
the market are reluctant to implement limit-pricing because coordi-
nation is difficult to achieve.88 It is arguable that coordination is not 
79. Bain acknowledges that the effect of potential competition on an oligopolistic 
market may be lessened because "collusion of either the e.xpress or· tacit variety may be 
imperfect in various degrees." J. BAIN, supra note 2, at 33. 
80. See generally F. SCHERER, supra note 36, at 192-98. 
81. Fog, How Are Cartel Prices Determined?, 5 J. INDUS. EcoN. 16, 19-20 (1956). 
82. F. SCHERER, supra note 36, at 186-92. 
83. See Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN, 
L. REv. 1562, 1566-75 (1969). See also G. STIGLER, supra note 61, at 39-56. 
84. Elzinga, supra note 44, at 210. . 
85. STANDARD&: PooR's INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 51, at L57. Because beer cannot 
be stored for long periods of time without deterioration and storage costs may be sig-
nificant, there is an incentive for each firm to cut its price in order to increase its share 
of the market during periods of low demand, such as winter. 
86. Elzinga, supra note 44, at 205-07. 
87. 410 U.S. at 550 (Marshall, J., concurring). It is also possible that an effective con-
straint on pricing in the New England market was the ability of firms outside the 
market profitably to ship in beer if prices reached a certain level. If this price level was 
below the limit-price for forestalling entry, the presence of a perceived potential entrant 
would make no difference. In fact, Liebmann and P. Ballantine&: Sons, both of which 
sold significant amounts of beer in New England, were located in the New York City 
area. Brief for the United States at 10. 
88. Where this is the case, an existing seller may prefer to adopt strategics other 
than limit-pricing in order to keep out potential entrants. For e.xample, the existing 
seller could indicate that, if a new firm were to enter the market, it would cause e.xtra 
expenses for the newcomer (perhaps by sharply raising its advertising budget) or reduce 
the newcomer's opportunity for making any profit (perhaps by engaging in price wars 
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necessarily required to implement limit-pricing. Unlike the situation 
in which one firm seeks to impose a higher price on the rest of the 
market, a decision to limit the price may be imposed by a firm that 
unilaterally decides to adopt that strategy, for the other firms may 
lose substantial sales if they refuse to follow suit. Nonetheless, a firm 
may be reluctant to initiate a price reduction for fear that, the other 
firms ·will misread its intentions and start a price war leading to 
lower profits for all.89 Furthermore, once effected, a limit-price 
achieved without coordination may not be stable because marginalist 
output determination rules do not apply in this setting.00 While 
total group output is determinant of the limit-price, no rule indicates 
to each individual firm how much of the total output ·to produce. 
Consequently, absent overt agreement, it is likely that the group will 
produce too much or too little, and the limit-pricing •will break 
down. This natural tendency toward breakdown is greater in markets 
where, as in the beer industry, significant economies of scale provide 
an especially strong incentive to produce a larger share of the output 
and where there are the problems of coordination discussed above.91 
Not only was the perceived potential competition doctrine that 
was accepted by Justice White flawed in both application and theory, 
but his brief opinion-also failed to recognize the benefits that may 
be derived from the merger of a perceived potential competitor with 
a large existing seller. Two kinds of benefits could be lost by for-
bidding leading-firm acquisitions by perceived potential entrants. 
One is that derived from the threat of takeover of firms in the market 
by the bystander.92 Proscription of leading-firm acquisitions would 
when the newcomer's start-up expenses were high). See generally F. MACHLuP, THE 
EcoNOIIIICS OF SELLERS' COIIIPE'ITilON 535 (1952). Moreover, rather than limiting·its price 
to discourage entry, an existing seller may discourage entry by attaching itself more 
securely to its present customers by ties of goodwill. F. SCKERER, supra note 36, at 222 • 
. 89. It has been noted that the "desire to avoid cutthroat competition tends to make 
for downward price rigidity" in oligopolies. w. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW 
227 (1960). Machlup has said of the firm in an uncoordinated oligopoly: "Such an 
oligopolist appears to be on the horns of a dilemma: low prices might induce his actual 
competitors to start competing vigorously or even belligerently; high prices might in-
duce potential competitors to appear on the scene and claim a share in the market." 
F. MACHLuP, supra note 88, at 537. 
90. F. ~CKERER, supra note 36, at 223. 
91. Although there has been little direct empirical study of the extent to which 
limit-pricing actually occurs, studies have been made of the relation between the height 
of barriers to entry and profit rates. See, e.g., J. BAIN, supra note 2, at 190-201; Mann, 
A Note on Barriers to Entry and Long Run Profitability, 14 ANTITRusr BULL. 845 (1969); 
Mann, Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry, and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries, 
1950-1960, 48 REv. EcoN. STAT. 296 (1966). Scherer, however, points to some examples 
of actual limit-pricing at various points in time in the copper, rayon, coal, and copying 
machine industries. F. SCHERER, supra note 36, at 215-16, 225. 
92. Berry, Economic Policy and the Conglomerate Merger, in CONGLOMERATE MERG-
ERS AND ACQUISITIONS: OPINION AND ANALYSIS, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REY. 266, 280 (Spec. ed., 
I , 
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partially insulate existing producers from external incentives to re-
main efficient. If such acquisitions were 11llowed, the threat of take-
.overs might lead existing management to perform efficiently in order 
to keep shareholders satisfied. 93 However, the loss of this benefit 
would not be total, because there will often be firms or groups that 
pose a takeover threat but are not perceived potential entrants and 
firm acquisition by them will not be barred by the rule. 
A second, more important cost of prohibiting the acquisition of 
a leading firm by a perceived potential competitor is the loss of the 
competitive benefits that would result from the actual entry. A num-
ber of economies could be derived from such mergers.04 More sig-
nificantly, the takeover may have desirable effects on the behavior 
of other firms in the market if the injection of a new decision-making 
entity shakes up existing market behavior patterns and upsets oligo-
polistic pricing practices. 95 A beneficial result would be most ex-
pected from actual entry into a tight oligopoly.00 Because the situa-
tion is not likely to be competitive before the acquisition, no sub-
stantial increase in uncompetitive behavior would be possible, and 
there may be a chance that new mrnership of one of the firms would 
break do,;rn existing interdependent behavior.97 In contrast, the ef-
fects of entry by large-firm acquisition into a more loosely structured 
oligopolistic market may be expected to be, on balance, undesirable. 
In that situation, there is little to be gained by the injection of a new 
competitive force, and there may be significant losses if the new en-
tity becomes a dominant firm or a price leader, or otherwise con-
tributes to an increase in the possibility of oligopolistic behavior. 
Thus, the costs of proscribing ,leading-firm acquisitions by perceived 
potential entrants would theoretically be greatest in a tightly oli-
gopolistic market, precisely the situation in which the benefits of 
retaining the firm on the edge of the market would also be greatest.08 
Spring 1970); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN, 
110, 113 (1965). 
93. Berry, supra note 92, at 280; Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust 
Laws, 73 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 555, 562-63 (1973). However, other, less desirable reactions arc 
possible. For example, management could attempt to discourage takeovers by disguising 
the profitability of the enterprise. 
94. See generally Turner, supra note 2, at 1323-39. See also Blake, supra note 93, at 
562-63. Bork has argued that the loss of economies of integration would be a significant 
cost of proscribing leading-firm acquisitions. REPORT OF THE WHITE HousE TASK FoRCE 
ON ANTITRUST POLICY Guly 5, 1968), in 115 CONG. REc. 13890, 13905-06 (1969), 
95. Turner, supra note 2, at 1383. 
96. See P. STEINER, supra note 36. 
97. "In practically every case, entry led to a permanent lowering of leading firm 
profit rates and pricing moderation if not outright price cuts. The inference is that 
important entry did exert a long run impact on industry performance and that large 
entrants were not successfully digested into any post-entry collusion." M. Harris, supra 
note 54, at 158. 
98. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra. 
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This would suggest that on absolute prohibition such as that implied 
by the plurality opinion in Falstaff is not the most appropriate way 
to deal with the problem of perceived potential competition. 
Justice White's opinion did not look as closely as possible at the 
benefits and costs of prohibiting the acquisition of Narragansett. 
The merger would probably not have had anticompetitive effects. In 
some cases, the replacement of the remaining major local firm by a 
national firm may facilitate cooperation by the nationals in the 
market by replacing an inhibiting factor with a firm that shares its 
fellow nationals' interests.99 But Narragansett was a declining and 
disadvantaged firm vis-a-vis the nationals100 and thus probably had 
no important limiting effect on their behavior. In fact, it probably 
preferred to price higher than the national brewers. A closer analysis 
may have actually revealed procompetitive entry effects, for the com-
bination of Falstaff's national status and Narragansett's local market-
ing experience may have created a more effective rival for the na-
tional brewers in the market. 
The foregoing discussion should suggest that the approach taken 
by Justice White in Falstaff was not adequate. He was satisfied to 
consider only whether Falstaff was perceived as a potential entrant 
and would not go further to enquire whether its existence on the 
edge of the market actually had a beneficial influence. Some of the 
conditions theoretically necessary for the effective functioning of the 
theory of limit-pricing as a basis of the perceived potential competi-
tion doctrine may have been absent in the Falstaff situation, and 
there are also underlying weaknesses in the doctrine itself. Because 
of these uncertainties, direct proof of a beneficial edge effect should 
perhaps be required. Moreover, the Court's opinion did not suffi-
ciently consider the probable post-entry effect of the proposed acqui-
sition. Pa:rticularly since the entry effect may be most beneficial in 
preGisely those cases in which there may also be a beneficial edge 
effect,101 a more detailed inquiry would seem to be necessary. How-
ever, such an expanded inquiry would not be easy. Direct evidence 
of the existence of limit-pricing is often ambiguous,1°2 and, where 
reliable post-acquisition evidence is not available, the probable entry 
effect is difficult to predict. The most effective method, as ·will be 
suggested later,103 may be one that relies on the use of rebuttable 
presumptions. · · 
99. This may occur because nationals can cooperate more easily with other na-
tionals, since they will take into consideration conditions in other markets, rather than 
just conditions in the local market. 
100. From 1964 to 1969, Narragansett's share of the market slipped from 21.5 per 
cent to 15.5 per cent. 410 U.S. at 530 n.11. 
101. See text accompanying note 98 supra. 
102. See Turner, supra note 2, at 1376. 
103. See text accompanying notes 153-64 infra. 
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In their concurring opinions Justices Marshall and Douglas ex-
amined the potential competition problem in somewhat more depth 
than the majority. Between them, they suggested two approaches ig-
nored by the district court that might have led to a finding of an 
unacceptable loss of potential competition despite the lack of proof 
of a subjective intent to enter de novo on the part of the Falstaff 
management. First, it was suggested that the question of Falstaff's 
status as a probable actual entrant was still open because the lower 
court had failed to consider important objective evidence;104 and, 
second, it was suggested that possible anticompetitive effects in the 
relatively distant future should be taken into account in evaluating 
the merger, even if proof that the acquisition had a present delete-
rious effect on competition could not be made.106 
Justice Marshall's basic disagreement was with the way that the 
district court handled the evidence presented at trial on the question 
of whether Falstaff was a probable actual entrant. In particular, he 
differed with the trial court's reliance on the statement by Falstaff's 
management that it had decided not to enter the market de novo in 
the future. He thought that such subjective evidence was unreliable 
because "any statement of future intent will be inherently self-
serving"106 and that it should thus be given very little weight. More-
over, even if the subjective evidence is accurate as to present intent, 
it should not be decisive where there is strong objective evidence 
that it is in the firm's economic self-interest to enter de novo and that 
the firm is capable of doing so, because there remains the possibility 
of a change of mind or a change of management.107 The trial court's 
approach, Justice Marshall said, runs counter to accepted assump-
tions about corporations as profit-maximizing institutions.108 Addi-
tionally, the use of subjective evidence is particularly inappropriate 
where the court must determine how the company would react ,vere 
the alternative of entry by acquisition foreclosed.100 The necessity 
of seriously considering the merits of de novo entry may not have 
been brought home to the management at the time of the decision 
104. 410 U.S. at 571-72 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
105. 410 U.S. at 539, 544 (Douglas, J., concurring), 547 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
106. 410 U.S. at 568. Justice Marshall's concern is certainly legitimate. Pitofsky has 
pointed out that firms with sophisticated legal advice may actually create subjective 
evidence formally indicating that the alternative of independent entry was rejected. 
Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1024. See also Davidow, supra note 2, at 1245-46. 
107. 410 U.S. at 568-69 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
108. 410 U.S. at 568. 
109. Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1023-24; Comment, supra' note 13, at 160. Pitofsky 
has also pointed out that the use of subjective evidence is complicated because each 
firm may consist of several different decision-making groups. Pitofsky, supra, at 1021·22, 
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to acquire; at the trial, consequently, the firm may well be able to 
point to convincing evidence that the option of de novo entry was 
considered and rejected.11° A final problem, suggested in the gov-
ernment's brief in Falstafj,111 is that an overly great reliance on sub-
jective evidence will lead to uncertainty in the application of the 
doctrine of potential competition. 
Because of these problems, Justice Marshall would give consider-
ably more weight to objective evidence. He would still give some 
weight to subjective evidence because it provides one expert inter-
pretation of the objective market forces112 and because "the character 
of management is itself essentially an objective factor in determin-
ing whether the acquiring firm is an actual potential entrant."113 
But Justice Marshall suggested that strong objective evidence, even if 
there is credible subjective evidence to the contrary, will usually 
be enough to establish "a reasonable chance of fut1:1re competition," 
the loss of which is sufficient for a section 7 violation.114 
However, in antitrust cases objective evidence itself raises prob-
lems that Justice Marshall ignored. Like subjective evidence, it may 
be very hard to assess.115 For instance, most objective characteristics, 
such as barriers to entry, are nearly impossible to measure without 
considerable cost.116 Furthermore, the interpretation of inconsistent 
or conflicting data, an awesome task in the best of situations, is even 
more formidable in these cases. As the discussion of limit-pricing 
theory indicates,117 economists themselves are not certain what 
weight to give to different indicia. This confusion is accentuated in 
the judicial setting, for few judges are trained to evaluate such 
proof.118 As then Professor Bok pointed out over a decade ago, the 
adversary system is particularly unsuited to weighing objective evi-
dence in merger cases, for the truth often lies, not at one end or an-
other of the adversary poles, but somewhere in between.119 Finally, 
because, in antitrust cases, conflicting data may be the norm rather 
than the exception and because different inferences can rationally be 
drawn from the evidence, it may be more possible for judges in such 
110. Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1024. 
111. Brief for the United States at 23-24. 
112. 410 U.S. at 564-65. 
113. 410 U.S. at 565. 
114. 410 U.S. at 570. 
115. See generally Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and 
Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 278-99 (1960). • 
116. See generally Disner, Barrier Analysis in Antitrust Law, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 862, 
905-12 (1973). 
117. See text.accompanying notes 68-91 supra. 
118. Bok, supra note 115, at 291. 
119. "Adversary_litigation is probably at its best where the questions'at issue are of 
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cases to allow their individual preferences and preconceptions to 
color their evaluation of objective facts.120 
These problems associated with the use of objective evidence in 
antitrust cases are especially critical when the potential competition 
doctrine is involved. In some cases it may be impossible to determine 
solely on the basis of objective evidence which of several alternative 
courses of expansion a firm was most likely to undertake. Further-
more, many objective facts-such as the amount of a firm's financial 
resources and the prestige of its name-that are used to prove that 
a firm is a potential entrant because it is in a good position to over-
come the barriers to entry take the form of gross data that apply to 
many firms. In these situations, the same evidence that establishes 
that a firm is a probable entrant also tends to prove that it was not 
unique and, thus, that its elimination as a potential competitor has 
no anticompetitive effect.121 
Some of the difficulties inherent in the use of objective evidence 
are less of a problem in market-extension merger cases like Falstaff 
than they would be in product-extension merger cases.122 It is prob-
ably fair to say that Falstaff's most likely course of expansion was 
into beer markets in other geographical areas. It would be more dif-
ficult in a product-extension merger case to determine on the basis 
of objective evidence alone which of several alternative courses of 
expansion the potential entrant was most likely to pursue.123 Also, 
in a market-extension merger like that involved in Falstaff the unique-
ness requirement will be more easily met, for only a very few other 
large firms engaged in the selling of the product will not be in the 
relevant geographical market already.124 
a predominantly 'either-or' variety, and the problem is largely one of deciding which 
side is correct. In the complex statistical and theoretical jungle of a merger proceeding, 
few disputes fit this description." Id. 
120. Id. at 296. 
121. As Davidow illustrates, defendants can tum the use of objective evidence to 
their own advantage: 
"If all it takes to be a potential entrant," they will say, "is the objective capability, 
over time and with considerable effort, to enter the business successfully, and if lack 
of evidence of any inclination to do this is irrelevant then my company was indeed 
a 'potential entrant'-but so were and are numerous other powerful diversifying 
corporations that I will now name!" 
Davidow, supra note 2, at 1247. 
122. A product-extension merger is one in which the firm acquires a company pro-
ducing a different product, which is related to a product of the acquiring firm because 
it can be produced with a similar production process, sold through the same marketing 
channels, or developed through the same research facilities. See Davidow, supra note 2, 
at 1232. 
123. See P. STEINER, supra note 36. 
124. Because these firms already have a developed capability for manufacturing and 
selling that product, they are uniquely situated vis-a-vis large firms producing in other 
industries. In contrast, there may be many large firms in several different industries 
that are equally capable potential entrants by a product-extension merger. 
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However, even though Falstaff was a market-extension case, the 
basic problem of weighing objective evidence and predicting be-
havior on that basis was still very evident, especially with regard to 
the determination of whether Falstaff was in fact a potential entrant 
other than by acquisition of Narragansett. For example, predicted 
profitability is a prime determinant of whether a firm will decide to 
enter a given market. In Falstaff, the experts could not agree, even 
given a single figure for projected profits, whether that figure was 
adequate to induce entry other than by large-firm acquisition. A study 
commissioned by Falstaff recomn;iended de novo entry,125 but an 
independent economist, who testified for Falstaff, felt that the profit 
return on de novo entry-6.7 per cent-made it "a very, very poor 
investment indeed."126 It is clear that objective evidence must be 
used with some care. Therefore, a serious effort should be made to 
develop specific objective criteria that can be given special weight.127 
In addition, both Justic!! Marshall and Justice Douglas suggested 
that future anticompetitive effects be given more weight than the 
trial court thought, appropriate. They argued that a finding of il-
legality could be made even if Falstaff did not have a present in-
fluence on competitive conditions in the market and even if it had 
presently decided not to enter the New England market other than 
by acquisition of Narragansett.128 In contrast, the Court's opinion 
explicitly left open the question whether future anticompetitive 
effects could be taken into account in cases like Falstaff.129 
Since the enactment of the revised Clayton Act, 130 the Supreme 
Court has shown an ever-increasing willingness to consider the ef., 
fects of horizontal mergers and acquisitions on future competitive 
conditions.131 This development has naturally carried over to poten-
tial competition cases b'ecause the procompetitive effect of a prob-
able actual entrant is, to a more or less attenuated extent, always in 
the fut:ure.132 
125. 410 U.S. at 553 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
126. 410 U.S. at 554 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
127. See Brodley, supra note 2, at 358-59. 
128. 410 U.S. at 539, 544 (Douglas, J., concurring), 547 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
129. 410 U.S. at 537. 
130. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125. 
131. See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); United States v. Von's 
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 
(1963). See generally Bork &: Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CotuM. L. REv. 363, 
368-69 (1965); Blake &: Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 C0LUM, L. REv. 377, 398-99 
(1965). 
132. Rahl has argued that the probable-actual-entrant variant, unlike the perceived-
potential-entrant form of potential competition, has no place in the statutory scheme 
precisely because the loss by merger of that type of firm would have no immediate 
effect on competitive conditions: 
Where potential competition is offered as a living substitute for the actual competi-
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A firm that has no present procompetitive effect on a market 
by virtue of potential-competitor status may come to have such an 
effect in either of two ways. First, there may be structural or be-
havioral changes within the relevant market. Second, the status 
of the bystander itself may change so that it becomes a perceived 
potential competitor, although at present it is not so perceived by 
existing firms, or so that it becomes a probable actual entrant, al-
though at present it is neither interested in nor capable of entering 
the market. 
One ·way in which structural or behavioral changes may bring 
potential competition into play was described by Justice Marshall in 
Falstaff: 
[E]ven if the market is presently competitive, it is possible that it 
might grow less competitive in the future. For e..xample, a market 
might be so concentrated that even though it is presently competi-
tive, there is a serious risk that parallel pricing policies might emerge 
sometime in the near future. In such a situation, an effective com-
petitor lingering on the fringe of the market-what might be 
called a potential perceived potential entrant-could exert a deter-
rent force when anticompetitive conduct is about to emerge.1aa 
Another possible relevant change in the market was recognized in 
Kennecott Copper Corporation v. FTC,184 which involved the acqui-
sition of Pea}?ody Coal by Kennecott Copper Corporation. Unlike 
the situation suggested by Justice Marshall, the market structure in 
Kennecott Copper was not yet a tight oligopoly.136 The court, 
however, found the merger unlawful; its decision was based on the 
FTC's finding that the market was in the incipient stages of becom-
ing an oligopoly sufficiently tight for tacitly coordinated pricing.186 
A change in the attitude or ability of the bystander can occur in 
several ways. A likely example was suggested by Justice Marshall, 
who described a bystander firm with no present intent to enter that 
changes its mind as it more correctly perceives that the objective 
tion protected by the statute, it would seem essential to identify the firm or firms 
asserted to be potential competitors and to show that their _l)Otential competition 
was performing the kind of role performed by actual competition-in other words, 
that under the particular circumstances the future potentiality constituted a present 
force, keeping "power in check," or enforcing behavior "approaching the com• 
petitive norm." 
Rahl, Applicability of the Clayton Act to Potential Competition, 12 .AMERICAN DAR 
AssN., SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROCEEDINGS 128, 137 (1958). Dut Rabi's narrow view 
has been rejected. The Court in Penn-Olin explicitly stated that proof of future com-
petitive effect was relevant to a determination of whether a merger violated section 7, 
United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 177 (1964). 
133. 410 U.S. at 560 n.15 (emphasis original). 
134. 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972). 
135. 467 F.2d at 75. 
136. 467 F.2d at 75. 
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factors favor entry.137 In his concurrence Justice Douglas proposed 
an example that encompasses both ways in which the potential 
competition doctrine can be brought into play in the future: A 
firm that has, for the present, decided against entry is led to change 
its mind because changes in the market make entry more attrac-
tive.1ss 
Failing to consider incipient effects could lead to serious prob-
lems in the future. Once a merger removes a firm on the edge that 
might have become a potential competitor in the future, the possible 
benign influence of that firm will be lost forever.139 Because, as 
Turner has suggested, there is no antitrust enforcement technique 
for dealing directly ·with concentration, a high premium is placed 
on preserving all such "significant potentialities of future competi-
tion."140 Moreover, permitting a merger· that involves a potential 
entrant may even accelerate or initiate a tendency towards a non-
competitive structure. For example, a merger involving one large 
potential entrant could trigger acquisitive activity by firms outside 
the market or by small firms within the market that must combine 
to meet the challenge of the new entrant. In fact, the expansion by 
merger of some nationals in the beer industry seems to have been a 
considerable motivating factor in later market extensions by other 
firms, including Falstaff.141 
However, as Justice Marshall acknowledged,142 problems of proof 
are compounded when incipient future effects are considered. The 
problems may be similar to, and even more difficult than, those that 
arise in determining whether a firm is a probable actual entrant.143 
Objectiv~ data on the question are difficult to assess, and there is no 
guarantee, for example, that the bystander's future behavior will 
correspond to predictions made on the basis of such evidence. Thus, 
when there is subjective evidence that a firm has made some decision 
as to the possibility of entry de novo, it should be entitled tq con-
siderable weight. 
Predictions of future anticompetitive effects are most difficult if 
the requirement of substantial probability is to be met in such' cases 
as Justice Douglas' example of the firm that changes its mind about 
137. 410 U.S. at 569. 
138. 410 U.S. at 544. 
139. 410 U.S. at 561 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also United States v. Wilson 
Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 562 (N.D. Ill. 19fj8). 
140. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Polides, 82 
HARV. L. REv. 1207, 1213 (1969). 
141. This is understandable in light of the competitive advantages that accrue to 
the national brewers vis-a-vis the regional brewers. See text accompanying note 18 
supra. 
142. 410 U.S. at 560 n.15. 
143. See text accompanying notes 106-27 supra. 
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entering a market after there is a change in the market structure.144 
In that situation, the court must consider, first, whether market con-
ditions will change so as to make entry more attractive; second, 
whether that possible change ·will lead to a change in the attitude or 
ability of the bystander so that the bystander will enter the market; 
and, third, whether that future entry will be significantly procom-
petitive, or whether so many other firms will also change their minds 
about entry that the loss of one potential entrant by merger will not 
be significant. 
The problem, then, with the consideration of incipient future 
effects is the same problem that pervades other aspects of the poten-
tial competition doctrine-the need to predict future firm conduct 
on the basis of inadequate structural indicia. Because a finding of 
illegality in a case involving Justice Douglas' example would require 
that a relatively large number of predictions of future changes in 
both market structure and firm behavior be made simultaneously, 
courts should be reluctant to find incipient anticompetitive effects 
in that situation. Indeed, if :findings of illegality were too easily made 
in such cases, there would not be many cases in which potential com-
petition would not be at issue.145 
Moreover, in cases like Kennecott,146 where there is at present 
neither anticompetitive structure nor anticompetitive behavior in 
the relevant market, the incipiency notion should lead to a finding 
of illegality only after close scrutiny of both the range of possible 
potential competitors and the range of possible substitutes for the 
relevant product. Where these exist there will probably be sufficient 
competitive restraints in the future even if one firm is removed from 
the edge of the market by merger. Therefore, in Kennecott, where 
there appeared to be a growing number of fuel products that would 
substitute for coal147 and where firms in other industries were also 
likely to become potential competitors,148 a finding of illegality was 
perhaps unwarranted. In contrast, in the bank merger cases now 
pending before the Supreme Court,149 a finding of illegality would 
be more justifiable, even if the relevant market is not anticompeti-
tive at the time of the acquisition, because there are not likely to be 
144. 410 U.S. at 544. 
145. See 410 U.S. at 555-56 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
146. See text accompanying notes 134-36 supra. 
147. See discussion of coal substitutes in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 
341 F. Supp. 534, 545-46 (N.D. m.), afjd., 42 U.S.L.W. 4368 (U.S., March 19, 1974). 
148. See Casenote, 86 HARv. L. REv. 772, 780 (1973). 
149. United States v. Connecticut Natl. Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240 (D. Conn. 1973), 
prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3386 (U.S., Jan. 7, 1974) (No. 73-767); United States v. 
Marine Bancorporation, 1973-1 Trade Cas. 1[ 74,496 (W.D. Wash. 1973), prob. jurls. 
noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S., Oct. 15, 1973) (No. 73-38). 
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significant new substitutes for certain types of banking services150 
and because regulatory policies in that industry make it likely that 
future sources of new competition in regional markets within a 
state will be few in number.151 
III 
More specific suggestions can be made for a general approach to 
evaluating evidence in cases in which questions of potential competi-
tion arise. From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that two re-
quirements must be met by any suggested approach. First, it must 
be based on sound economic theory that is predictive of firm be-
havior. In this respect the Court's implicit reliance on limit-pricing 
theory may have been excessive. More specifically, the procompeti-
tive edge effect of the perceived potential competitor should be care-
fully evaluated,152 and the courts should give more recognition to 
other procompetitive effects, especially those attendant upon cer-
tain forms of actual entry. Second, adequate provision must be made 
for effective judicial administration of the potential competition 
doctrine. Neither subjective nor objective evidence is. completely 
problem-free. An approach that would be sound in theory and rela-
tively easy to administer could be based on the use of selective pre-
sumptions and on the reference to additional objective factors to re-
but the presumptions or to aid in decision-making when the pre-
sumptions are not applicable.153 
A modified version of the "toehold theory"154 is the most prom-
ising source of such a system of presumptions. That theory was first 
formulated in the Federal Trade Commission's opinion in Bendix 
Corporation.155 The hearing examiner, having found that Bendix 
would not have entered the relevant market de novo, dismissed the 
case because he felt that Bendix could not be classified as a potential 
competitor under then-current doctrine.156 Reversing the decision, 
the Commissioners pointed out that adverse effects on competition 
may also result from the elimination of a firm that would have 
150. See United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). 
151. Baker, Potential Competition in Banking: After Greely, What?, 90 BANK. L.J. 
362, 369 (1973). 
152. But see Comment, supra note 13, at 174. 
153. See generally Brodley, supra note 2, at 358-59. 
154. See generally Comment, supra note 13. See also Davidow, supra note 2, at 1248-
49; Berger &: Peterson, supra note 2, at 500-01. 
155. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 19,288 (F.T.C. 1970), revd. on 
other grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971). 
156. 11 19,288 at 21,445. 
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entered by acquiring a "toehold" firm, that is, "a small company 
capable of expansion into a substantial competitive force.''167 
The evidentiary effect that should be given to the possibility or 
actuality of toehold acquisition has not yet been resolved.1G8 It is 
here suggested that it be used to establish certain presumptions that 
would affect the distribution of the burden of proof in product- and 
market-extension merger cases. An acquisition of an available toe-
hold firm, for example, would be presumed legal, and a greater 
burden of proof of illegality would be placed on the government. 
However, in a case involving the acquisition of a leading firm where 
the government shows that toehold firms were available for acquisi-
tion and that the acquiring firm had the means to acquire them and 
to build them into profitable competitive entities, the acquisition 
should be presumed illegal, and the burden should shift to the ac-
quiror. These presumptions could be rebutted by such evidence as 
that going to actual or potential entry effects, the capability of the 
bystander firm to acquire and develop a toehold firm, and the com-
petitive potential of the acquired firm. But, in the great majority of 
cases, the operation of the presumptions should be determinative. 
The classification of a certain firm as a toehold could be made, 
for example, on the basis of its absolute share of the market, its 
market share relative to the share of the largest firm in the market, 
or its market share relative to the aggregate share of a given number 
of the largest firms in the market. Conventional potential competi-
tion theory would suggest that only those acquisitions that are tanta-
mount to the addition of competition by de novo entry should be 
157. 11 19,288 at 21,445. 
Various forms of merger entry other than through acquisition of a leading com-
pany-for example, a "toehold" acquisition of a small company capable of e,..:pan• 
sion into a substantial competitive force-may be as economically desirable and 
beneficial to competition as internal expansion into a relevant market, and must 
be considered in assessing the poteyitial competition of the acquiring firm which 
has been eliniinated as a result of the challenged merger. 
Although previous cases • • • have only involved potential entry in one form, 
i.e., by internal expansion, it is clear that the form of entry was not controlling 
in these decisions. What was determinative in each of these cases was • • • the 
actual eliniination of the additional decision-making, the added capacity, and the 
other market stimuli which would have resulted had entry taken a procompetitive 
form •••• 
,J 19,288 at 21,445 (emphasis original). 
The toehold doctrine has played a role in several other cases. See, e.g., United States 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1258 (D.D. Cal. 19'73), appeal doclieted, 42 
U.S.L.W. 3471 (U.S., Feb. 9, 1974) (No. 73-1224); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 
297 F. Supp. 1061, 1069-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd. sub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401 
U.S. 986 (1971); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 563 (N.D. 
Ill. 1968); Stanley Works, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REc. REP. ,! 19,646 
(F.T.C. 1971), affd., 469 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 928 (1973): Kenne• 
cott Copper Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REc. REP. 1) 19,619 (F.T.C. 1971), 
affd., 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972); Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] 
TRADE REc. REP. 1117,244 (F.T.C. 1965). 
158. See Comment, supra note 13, at 175-77. 
March 1974] Notes 863 
allowed. Otherwise, the acquisition merely replaces one competitive 
force with another, while removing the possible beneficial impact 
of the outside firm as a perceived potential entrant or a probable 
actual de novo entrant. 
Presumptions of over-all competitive effect cannot be easily made 
when the acquired firm is large but not dominant. In such cases, the 
acquisition may merely replace an existing competitive force with a 
new one, or it may increase competition by augmenti,ng the vigor 
and resources of the acquired firm. Because it will thus be difficult 
to weigh the procompetitive effects of entry against the anticompeti-
tive effects of the loss of a potential competitor, the government 
should be required to prove its case without presumptions, by the 
use of objective evidence such as that describ~d below.159 
The use of toehold theory in the form of evidentiary presump-
tions would be niuch easier to administer than the approaches sug-
gested by the various members of the Court in Falstaff. The trial 
courts need no longer be mired in attempts to determine without 
adequate actual evidence whether a bystander that acquired a lead-
ing firm would have entered the market in another way.16° Further-
more, sorely needed certainty and predictability could be added 
through this approach.161 Judicial resources would be conserved, and 
businessmen would be able to plan more confidently, especially if 
a reverse presumption of legality were made applicable to actual 
toehold acquisitions. The result could be to channel merger activity 
into procompetitive forms.162 
The approach also rests on a sound theoretical basis in that it 
places adequate emphasis on the actual or probable effect of entry. 
It would allow those acquisitions that will add to competition and 
would proscribe those acquisitions that will not have the beneficial 
effect that would be achieved through a probable alternative form of 
entry. It assumes that such differential impacts can usually be gauged 
159. See text accompanying notes 165-77 infra. 
160. Comment, supra note 13, at 166. It could be argued, however, that the toehold 
theory would be disadvantageous because the uniqueness requirement will be more 
difficult to meet, in that a larger number of firms are qualified to make a toehold, in 
contrast to a de novo, entry. Id. at 173-74. A strict uniqueness requirement should not 
be incorporated in the approach suggested here. First, up to some point, at least, it is 
desirable to preserve as many probable actual toehold entrants as possible, since the 
probability of at least one of them entering the relevant market is thereby increased. 
Second, although several firms may be equally capable of a toehold entry, they may 
not be equally interested in entry into the market. The toehold presumption will 
not apply unless the firm has actually demonstrated its interest by attempting an ac-
quisition. Finally, uniqueness cannot be evaluated at one point in time. An entrant 
that is not unique ex ante may be unique ex post because further_ entry by equally 
capable firms is less likely once the entrant has added new capacity. See text preceding 
note 176 infra. 
161. Comment, supra note 13, at 166. 
162, Id. at 166-67, 
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by the relative size of the acquired firm. When that assumption is 
incorrect,163 the normal presumption can be overcome. 
Moreover, there is a strong probability that potential competi-
tion will be lost in the leading-firm acquisitions to which the pre-
sumption of illegality would be applied. It can be assumed that, in 
most market- and product-extension cases, the bystander would have 
acquired an available small firm in some comparable market if the 
alternative of leading-firm acquisition had been definitely foreclosed. 
Its financial ability to make such a purchase and its interest in doing 
so are shown by its acquisition of the leading firm. Also, in market-
and product-extension cases the acquiring and the acquired firms 
will have complementary characteristics and experience, so an as-
. sumption that the toehold is likely to be operated profitably and 
made into an important competitive force is not unfounded. The 
barriers to entry in product-extension cases may be more easily over-
come by toehold acquisition than by de novo entry because the by-
standers can benefit from the technical capability and marketing 
experience of the toehold firm. And the costs of having to operate at 
below optimal scale in a market of only slowly increasing demand 
are not as serious if a toehold acquisition is made.164 
The theoretical soundness of these presumptions does depend on 
the existence of certain conditions that should be kept in mind by 
the courts. In cases where the toehold theory is applicable, the lack 
of these conditions may overcome the presumption, and, where the 
toehold theory is not applicable, the existence or. lack of the condi-
tions should be given special evidentiary weight. 
The first condition is that the merger involved be a market- or 
product-extension conglomerate merger. The validity of the pre-
sumption of illegality in a market-extension acquisition of a leading 
firm has been discussed above. Market-extension expansion is easily 
perceived by existing firms, and the bystander is often uniquely 
capable of entering the market. In fact, market-extension mergers 
are so highly suspect that they should be carefully scrutinized even 
where the toehold theory is not applicable. In such cases, the courts 
should focus on such matters as whether plant-scale or distributional 
considerations militate against de novo entry,160 for, if they do not, a 
finding of potential-competitor status will often be justified. 
If the merger at issue is of the pure conglomerate variety, the 
toehold theory should not be applicable, and the courts should be 
reluctant to find it illegal in any case. Because the products of the 
merging firms are. not complementary and the acquiring firm had 
no identifiable relation to the market before the merger, its entry 
163. See text accompanying notes 173-75 infra. 
164. Cf. text accompanying notes 50-56 supra. 
165. See note 55 and text accompanying notes 50-54 supra. 
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would have been difficult to predict until the acquisition actually took 
place. Therefore, the firm would usually not have been perceived by 
existing firms as a potential competitor. For similar reasons, it can-
not be said that the firm was a probable actual entrant because it 
would often be difficult and unprofitable for it to enter de novo or 
by toehold. Since purely-financial considerations often underlie pure 
conglomerate mergers, 166 the likelihood of a more competitive form 
of entry into the same market cannot be inferred from the mere fact 
of acquisition itself.167 Moreover, a large number of firms are likely 
to have been as well-positioned for entry as the acquiring firm, for 
it had no special expertise in the market. Therefore, it would be 
difficult to meet the uniqueness requirement in such cases.168 In addi-
tion, if leading-firm acquisitions of the pure conglomerate variety, as 
well as market- and product-extension acquisitions of leading firms, 
were effectively discouraged, society would, to a great extent, lose 
both the beneficial effect on inefficient managers of large firms of 
the fear of takeovers by firms outside the market,169 and the bene-
ficial effect of the takeovers themselves. 
Product-extension mergers fall into a middle ground. Although 
they should come within the purview of the toehold theory, in such 
cases a finding of illegality should not otherwise be easily made on 
the basis of obj~ctive criteria. In a product-extension merger, unlike 
most'market-extension mergers, the firm is likely to be equally well-
suited for entry into several other markets, for it could just as easily 
choose to expand into any of several complementary products. More-
over, because a large number of firms in several different industries 
are likely to be faced ·with approximately the same barriers to entry 
for the market, the uniqueness requirement is not likely to be easily 
met. Also, a firm involved in a product-extension merger is less 
likely to be a potential entrant de novo than a firm involved in a 
market-extension merger. The availability of a toehold acquisition 
in such cases is important, for it may enable a firm not already pro-
ducing in the market to overcome any special barriers to entry as-
sociated with the relevant market, such as patents or marketing ex-
pertise, whereas the availability of a toehold may not be as important 
to a firm already producing in the same industry. Therefore, whereas 
in all leading-firm JD.arket-extension mergers the burden of proof of 
illegality should be somewhat eased, in product-extension mergers 
detailed proof that the firm was a unique potential competitor 
should be required if the toehold presumptions are not applicable. 
166. F. SCHERER, supra note 136, at 113-14. 
167. See J. MARKHAM, supra note 73, at 125-26. 
168. See Dam, Corporate Takeovers and the Antitrust Laws, 39 ABA .ANrrrnusr L.J. 
196, 201 (1969). 
169. Id. at 202. 
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A second consideration that should be carefully examined by the 
courts is the actual entry effect. This concept has already played a 
part in developing the potential competition doctrine. Special recog-
nition has been given to the possibility that a large firm will become 
dominant after entry,170 and mergers involving potential entrants 
have been proscribed where the effect would be to raise the barriers 
to entry significantly.171 Also, the entry effect of alternative forms of 
acquisitions has, at least implicitly, been acknowledged in the formu-
lation of the toehold theory. Nonetheless, as the discussion of Falstaff 
indicates,172 the importance of the entry effect has not received ade-
quate recognition. 
It should be given greater weight in at least three different re-
spects. First, it should be recognized that, in markets that are tight 
oligopolies, beneficial entry effects may arise even in cases of entry 
by large-firm acquisition, 173 because such an entry could break down 
existing patterns of tacitly collusive behavior. Since the market is 
already noncompetitive, there is little to lose in such a situation and 
everything to gain. Therefore, the toehold presumption may be re-
butted and acquisition allowed, even if, on balance, the entry effect 
of a toehold acquisition would have been even better.174 
Second, it should be recognized that entry by toehold acquisition 
could have a deleterious effect in a loosely oligopolistic market 
where the ·present and probable future competitive conditions are 
relatively satisfactory. In such a situation, there would be little to 
gain by the addition of a new competitive entity and everything to 
lose if the new entity became a price leader or otherwise aided anti• 
competitive interdependent behavior.170 In these cases the govern-
ment should be able to overcome the presumptive legality of a toe-
hold acquisition, and a firm that has made a leading-firm acquisition 
that is presumptively illegal should be allowed to offer proof that the 
alternative form of entry would not have led to a more beneficial 
result. 
Third, the entry effect of a potential entrant should be given 
more explicit consideration in determining whether it is unique. If 
the entry of a firm that was not unique before its entry raises bar-
riers to entry, then it could be unique after entry, either because 
· 170. See 410 U.S. at 558-59 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also FTC v. Procter 
&: Gamble Co., 886 U.S. 568, 575 (1967); Kennecott Copper Corp. v, FTC, 467 F,2d 67, 
78 (10th Cir. 1972). 
171. See FTC v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967); United States v. 
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 557, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1968), 
172. See text accompanying notes 94-100 supra. 
173. See te.,_t accompanying notes 96-97 supra. 
174. P. STEINER, supra note 36. 
175. Id. 
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other bystander firms have been eliminated from the edge of the 
market or because their entry has become much less likely. Similarly, 
if an entry reduces barriers to entry, then a potential entrant that 
was unique before entry may not be after e::_ntry.176 This would ap-
pear to be relatively unlikely but may occur when the entry demon-
strates to other bystanders that entry is either more feasible or more 
profitable than they had previously thought.177 
If the approach detailed at length above were applied in Falstaff 
on remand, it is likely that the merger-would be found to be illegal, 
a result that also seems likely under the approach required by ·the 
opinion of the Court. The presumption of illegality in a leading-firm 
acquisition when a to~hold is available should probably be applied, 
because there is evidence that Falstaff could have acquired a smaller 
brewer in the New England market and made it into a competitive 
force.178 Even if the government could not establish that the pre-
sumption should be applied, the fact that a market-extension merger 
was involved should lead the court to scrutinize the acquisition care-
fully. Finally, in this type of case, where there is a trend toward con-
centration179 and the acquiring firm is likely to be one of the few 
remaining sources of new competition,180 the possibility that Fal-
staff's existence on the edge of the market would have a future pro-
competitive effect should be taken into account. 
There is a possibility that Falstaff could rebut a presumption of 
illegality. However, that rebuttal would be difficult. For example, it 
is unlikely that Falstaff could demonstrate that the merger would 
have significant beneficial effects on the New England market. Fur-
thermore, under the toehold presumption, Falstaff would have the 
burden of proving that it would not have entered through toehold 
acquisition if the alternative of entering through acquisition of a 
leading firm had been foreclosed; this burden would be difficult to 
carry because of Falstaff's demonstrated interest in the market and 
its previous history of expansion through the acquisition of small 
firms. Nonetheless, Falstaff could demonstrate that there are substan-
tial advantages in entry through the acquisition of a large firm be-
cause it can operate at closer to optimal scale than it could if it had 
entered through a toehold, and that argument may persuade the 




178. Jurisdictional Statement of United States at 14-15. The government pointed 
to three small breweries in the New England market that Falstaff could have acquired. 
Because Falstaff was a large and experienced seller with a well-known name, it is likely 
it could build a small brewer into an effective competitor. 
179. 410 U.S. at 549-50. 
180. Elzinga, supra note 44, at 202. 
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breweries should not be determinative, because, if such a strategy
proved to be unprofitable, Falstaff may have been unwilling to con-
tinue it.
Even if the result under the suggested approach would, in Fal-
staff, lead to the same result as the Court's analysis, it should be pre-
ferred because it rests upon a more secure theoretical base and pro-
vides a more efficient and predictable means of deciding future cases.
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